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The Body of the Community
Peirce, Royce, and Nietzsche
Rossella Fabbrichesi
1 In The Problem of Christianity,1 in a chapter of an altogether semiotic and hermeneutic
character, Josiah Royce pays immediately his debt to Charles Sanders Peirce, and declares
that he is nothing but summarizing, in his own way, “some still neglected opinions which
were first  set  forth,  in outline,  more than forty years ago by our American logician,
Mr Charles Peirce, in papers which have been little read, but which, to my mind, remain
of very high value as guides of inquiry, both in Logic and in Theory of Knowledge” (Royce
2001: 275). He concludes: “let me next call attention to matters which I should never have
viewed as I now view them without his direct or indirect aid” (Royce 2001: 277).
2 He refers to Peirce’s 1868 essays Questions Concerning Some Faculties Claimed for Man and 
Some Consequences  of  Four  Incapacities,2 which appeared in the “Journal  of  Speculative
Philosophy” and where Peirce tried to demolish the traditional concepts of interiority,
introspection, immediate intuition and mental image. Here Peirce sustained that we have
no power of introspection, but that all knowledge of the internal world is derived from
hypothetical reasoning based on our knowledge of external facts, and that we have no
power of intuition, but every cognition is logically determined by previous cognition, that
is, every sign is a train of other signs. All thought is, in his opinion, to be reduced to sign
inferences, and this signifies that every thought must address itself to some other, must
be interpreted by some other, because this is the essence of the sign. Cognizability and
being  are  nearly  synonymous,  and  reality  itself  is  determined  by  the  public  truths
developed by a community, which plays its interpretations establishing what has to be
considered,  in  the  long  run,  “real.”  “The  real,  then,  is  that  which,  sooner  or  later,
information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of
the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that
this conception essentially involves the notion of COMMUNITY, without definite limits,
and  capable  of  an  indefinite  increase  of  knowledge”  (EP1:  52).  Real  things  are  of  a
“cognitive  and therefore  significative  nature,  so  that  the real  is  that  which signifies
something real” (EP1: 58). As Royce writes, “by the ‘real world’ we mean simply the ‘true
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interpretation’” (PC: 337) and “were there no interpretations in the world, there would be
neither selves nor communities” (PC: 274). Reality has the “structure of the Community”:
“the interpretation is real only if the appropriate community is real, and is true only if
that community reaches its goal” (PC: 339).
3 And, finally, what is true? Truth is public, writes Peirce; it belongs to the public consent,
to the “catholic” consent.3 In a word: truth is not the plain correspondence to reality, but
the infinite process of sign references developed by the community, constituting (and not
substituting) the real. This is why Peirce could write that “reality is an event indefinitely
future” (EP1: 64).
4 In the 1868 writings reality, truth and cognition are but signs. The last move of this kind
of “semiotization” of the existent, carried out by Peirce, is the brilliant theory of “man as
a sign.” Peirce introduces it recalling that the content of consciousness, or of the mind, is
simply  a  sign  resulting  from  inference.  There  is  nothing  more  profound  and  less
phenomenal than this. Talking of a philosophy of mind is like talking of a philosophy of
language, of sign and semiosis. So what distinguishes a man from a word? Is the mind
more  complicated,  more  conscious  than  a  word?  It  may  be,  writes  Peirce,  but
consciousness is a very vague term, and, as a matter of fact, all there is in the mind can
just be expressed through signs, verbal or not-verbal. “When we think, we, ourselves, as
we are at the moment, appear as a sign” (EP1: 38).
5 So, we may conclude that man is a sign, also, in the sense that he acquires information,
and comes to mean more than it did before, exactly as do words. Words could say to men:
“You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address
some word as the interpretant of your thought” (EP1: 54).
6 The signs that men use are the men themselves, concludes Peirce. As life is a train of
thoughts, and every thought is a sign, every man’s life is just a course of never-ending
semiosis. “Thus my language is the sum total of myself, for the man is the thought.” I
wish  to  recall  that  Wittgenstein  expressed  himself  in  the  Tractatus  in  a  similar  way
(Wittgenstein 1951: § 5.6).4 But, more precisely, every sign-thought is an external sign, a
sign that expresses itself in some habit of response, some physical quality or action; so,
not only can we say that man is a sign, but that he is an external sign (like any word, or
gesture, habit or deed), a sign that expresses itself in practice. It is hard for us, continues
Peirce, men of the Cartesian age, to bear this thought, because we identify the mind with
the will, the pure consciousness, with rationality and interiority. But the identity of man
resides in the consistency of what he does and thinks, and this consistency is expressed
through  a  system  of  signs,  and  translated  into  habits  and  praxes,  that  are  never
completely individual or idiosyncratic. The identity of man comes, thus, from a sort of
alterity, the alterity of the external signs in which his personhood is exposed and extended.
A complexity of sign relations that he is, not that he has.5
7 His consistency is given, as Peirce wrote elsewhere (EP1: 29), by the overlapping of many
fibres,  and thus by some kind of interconnected multiplicity.  As Leibniz wrote,  every
individual monad can be thought of as a garden full of plants; yet, each branch of these
plants,  each drop of  its  lymph,  is  also  some such garden.6 This  represents  a  strong
tradition  of  thinking  in  Western  philosophy:  Goethe  writes  that  any  individual  is  a
plurality,  and  also  beings.  Nietzsche,  in  turn,  worked  over  and  over  again  on  this
Goethian perspective, eventually developing his idea of a collective nature of the self.7
The individuum is not at all a “not dividuum” entity; but it is something internally spread,
and externally open to interpretations and modifications.
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8 Yet, there is another character that derives from the analogy traced between man and
sign. If a sign, as Peirce states, is anything which stands to somebody for something, it is
essentially a relation that lives in an endless chain of reference. If this series is broken off,
he writes, the sign falls short of its significant character. So, if we admit that man is a
sign, we ought to accept that man is a continually developing sign, never fully-acquired.
At  every  step,  we  recalculate  –  so  to  say  –  our  origin,  our  significance,  and  our
destination.
9 Like any sign, the man-sign lives in the translations and the references it gives rise to,
and its meaning resides in an uncertain area of transit. We must consent to thinking of
man  as  a  vague  and  potential  entity,  constantly  addressing  to  other  signs  as  its
Interpretants.  More  precisely,  as  a  sign  dependent  on  the  future  thought  of  the
community.  In  fact,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  last  lines  of  Some  consequences,  Peirce
approaches the idea of community: reality is nothing other than the “final product of
mental  action”  (W2:  471)  and  it  depends,  thus,  on  an  ideal  state  of  complete
interpretation, developed by an ideal community of thought. To be logical, man must not
be selfish. He has to recognize the identification of his own interest with those of a large
community, and he has to act following three sentiments (analogous to St.Paul’s trio of
Charity, Faith and Hope): the interest in an indefinite community, the recognition of the
possibility  of  this  interest  being  made  supreme,  and  the  hope  in  the  unlimited
continuance of intellectual activity.8 We’ll see that Royce is a perfect Peirce scholar on
this point. “The individual man – concludes Peirce in Some Consequences (EP 1:55) – since
his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything
apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is
man, proud man, Most ignorant of what he’s most assured, His glassy essence.”9
10 By the way, Peirce did not reject telepathy and carefully considered strange phenomena
such as multiple personality, and this should not sound out of place, in this perspective
that exalts individuality as dispersion in the community, openness to the future, a glassy,
vague, multiple and not-centred essence. If we seek the self, Peirce seems to say, we find
the other, many others, the whole community. The ego cogito is not our most evident
certainty, but the abyss of our most profound ignorance. And personality is not a solid
inner constitution, but a “bundle of habits,” of public truths and meanings. Better yet, as
we read in a manuscript:
Personality, on both sides, that of the unification of all of a body’s experiences, and
that of the isolation of different persons, is much exaggerated in our natural ways
of thinking, – ways that tend to puff up the person, and make him think himself far
more real than he veritably is. A person is, in truth, like a cluster of stars, which
appears to be one star when viewed with the naked eye, but which scanned with the
telescope of scientific psychology is found on the one hand, to be multiple within
itself,  and  on  the  other  to  have  no  absolute  demarcation  from  a  neighboring
condensation.10
11 Let’s now come to Royce. In the very beginning of PC, Royce insists on the following idea:
every community is a kind of organism, a live unit that has organs and a peculiar mind
(PC: 80). Like any organism, it can grow and loose strength, may live a sane or insane life,
may decay or undergo a complete metamorphosis, becoming a “corporate entity” of a
different dimension. Like any organism, in fact, a community nourishes itself with foreign
parts, that make its body grow and become a part of it (parts that are incorporated, we
could say). The community is not simply the collection of its individuals, as an organism
is not simply a whole composed, as a machine, by the assemblage of its parts. It has an
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identity, a consistency, a coordinated body and a “social soul,” that has aims, hopes and
common memories, that feels and suffers. The community is thus more real and concrete
than any single individual. Still better, the real self is the community, and, loving my
Beloved Community, I love my real self, myself in the others, myself in that third other
represented by the mediation of a public interpretation (called by Peirce “Final Logical
Interpretant” [CP 5.491]). The One and Simple I finds its real identity – as happened in the
Peircean system – in the polarity of Three of a sign relation.
12 The notion of self, of the discrete individual as something to be overcome is in fact at the
core of  the later  texts  of  Royce.  Any individual  must  surrender its  individuality and
particularity, to join the collective self,  the real unity of his community. “Every self’s
office is to conform to the mind to which he addresses his interpretation: his being chief
is due to his being first of all a servant, and his surrender is his victory” (PC: 317). With
astonishing similarity, Peirce wrote that “the great principle of logic is self-surrender,
which does not mean that the self is to lay low for the sake of an ultimate triumph” (CP
5.402, n.2). The Community of Interpretation traces a triadic sign-relation between the
individual, the community, and their common end; and, yet, it is only due to this act of
connection,  which  is  directed  to  the  fulfilment  of  a  determinate  purpose,  that  this
relationship  can  individuate  its  respective  poles  and  eventually  succeeds  in  being
significant.11
13 We could then say that for Royce, too-although he actually never refers to this part of
Peirce’s  article-man  is  simply  a  sign,  a  symbol  that  refers  to  other  signs  and
interpretations. There is no I in his philosophy, but the I is simply a transition (like the
single sign in the semiosis flux), and in any I is the We that talks. We must not say: so act
I;  but:  so  acts  the  community,  in  me  and  through  me,  and  when  I  listen  to  my
consciousness, I am listening to a plurality of voices, to a gorgeous polyphony. “We are
indeed many […] We may be many selves” (PC: 241).12
14 Similarly, Peirce wrote that we should say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts
are in us (as we say that we are in motion and not that motion is in a body (EP1: 42n)).
Which  thought?  The  Thought  Common to  all  (Logos),  as  already  Heraclitus  said,  the
Logical Interpretant of our age and culture, as Peirce would have said. And remember
that in ancient ages there was no Ego in play, but just the Community, the tribe, that
judged, exercised will, and responsibility, determined shame and produced satisfactions.
Any member of that group worked to potentiate the only real existent body, that of the
Community, acting as a limb of it, as a single powerful muscle, or a tissue, a cell, that
cooperated in the making of the living and fruitful practices of the group itself.
15 Yet, there is no ‘melting’ of the parts in the whole, losing their specificity: the idea of a
“collective self” is the idea of multiple units linked together as a functioning entity in the
flux of action, in the pragmatic deed, that may also be, on each occasion, different. Like a
dancer, this living body extends itself in time and space, reaching brand new dimensions.
The community body’s limbs do not work with reference to a centre that dominates them,
but they cooperate in the extension and articulation of any parts, in the mobility and
plasticity  of  the  ensemble,  in  the  reference  to  the  same  past  events  and  in  the
expectations of the same future events. But the ideal extension of the self does not only
imply  an  ideal  extension  in  the  past  and  future,  in  time  and  deeds,  but  is  also  an
extension to the physical objects of his practice. The knight or the samurai regarded his
sword as a part of himself, and so do we with our house or work’s tools. Where are the
self’s boundaries?  We  must  refer  to  this  extended  self,  that  expresses  himself
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pragmatically  in  deeds  and  common  actions,  that  addresses  himself  to  larger
interpretations. “The present self, the fleeting individual of today, is a mere gesticulation
of a self” (PC: 255).
16 Let’s now consider Peirce’s writing of 1892, Man’s glassy essence, published in “The Monist,”
in which he returns to his 1868 issues. Here he talks of the profound unity of certain
general ideas, that made them similar to a sort of personality. Indeed, a person is just a
particular kind of general idea, he writes, a pure symbol, and, viceversa, a general idea
has the unified living feeling of a person, it is “our little creature.” Similarly, there should
be something like a personal consciousness in the bodies of men who are in intimate and
intensely  sympathetic  communion.  Peirce  talks  of  esprit  de  corps,  national  sentiment,
sympathy  as  not  mere  metaphors.  There  are,  thus,  such  greater  persons,  sorts  of
corporations, of “corporate personalities” – and this word is very well found in a Roycean
view. Finally, Peirce appeals to the fact that, acting for a same end and through the same
means, many persons can behave as the same person, a strong and unique corps that
moves as a single organism. “When the thirty thousand young people of the society for
Christian Endeavour were in New York – he writes – there seemed to me to be some
mysterious diffusion of sweetness and light” (EP1: 350).13 This is Peirce in 1892, and we
saw what Royce had written later in 1913. More literally, in 1916, in a reply to Mary
Calkins Royce says: “For me, at present, a genuinely and loyally united community which
lives a coherent life is, in a perfectly [literal] sense, a person” (Royce 2001: 28). Which
lives a coherent life, that is, which operates through some consolidated praxes, which
translates in a living habit of response some definite pragmatic meanings. In the chapter
of PC on the “Doctrine of signs,” Royce’s man, like Peirce’s, says: “Alone I am lost, and am
worse than nothing. I need a counsellor, I need my community. Interpret me. Let me join
in this interpretation. Let there be the community […] This alone is real […] For if there is
no interpretation, there is no world whatever” (PC: 362). Nor, we could add, something
like a  man:  no object  and no subject  outside the realm of  interpretation,  and of  his
founding Community.
17 Although Royce did acknowledge Peirce’s evaluations, on this ground, he never seemed to
refer to the Peircean vision of  “man-sign,” nor to this  1892 writing,  despite both so
profoundly resonated with his own view.
18 But let’s come to some conclusions: both for Peirce and Royce, the idea of man, grounded
on the Cartesian division between soul and body, is something to be overcome. Towards
the idea of Community. Is then Community a kind of Super-Man?
19 I propose this term thinking of Nietzsche, of course, and this should not sound strange, if
we  keep  in  mind  that  Royce  knew  Nietzsche’s  writings  very  well,  especially  the
Zarathustra, and that he deeply appreciated some parts of his thought, introduced him in
America and was perhaps one of the few to understand his philosophy’s most original
aims.14 With Royce, and this is notable, Friedrich Nietzsche, in the early 1900’s, entered
one of the most important American Departments of Philosophy: Harvard in Cambridge.
Royce,  the  utmost  forerunner  of  Christianity,  seems to  have  opened the  way to  the
dangerous Anti-Christ.
20 Let’s consider, in conclusion, one of the later texts of Royce’s large production (published
posthumously),  the essay devoted to Nietzsche’s  thought (Royce 1917).  It  presumably
marked some intense years of reflection on the problems of will and personhood, and it
dealt with the tragic intertwining of life and interpretation of life in Nietzsche’s very
existence. There is then no doubt that Royce understood the problem of individuality as
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one of the leading themes of Nietzsche’s speculations. And he was surely right, because
the German author was in search of a new figure of man and humanity. Nonetheless,
Royce  individuated  a  loss  in  his  analysis,  regarding  the  concept  of  the  social  and
communitarian dimension of self. The aristocratic Nietzsche had neither the instruments,
nor the interest, for going in that direction;15 yet, his main problem remained that of the
“perfect individual selfhood” (Royce 1917: § IV),16 the creation of a “person of higher
level” (PC: 83), a theme that was dear to Royce himself.
21 Royce reasoned on this expression: what does the word selfhood mean? If we conceive man
as self-surrender, we are destined to meet the Other as perfection of the One. Could we
really think of the Superman as a stronger and superior man, as the “perfect self”? This is
very puerile:  we should rather think of  a  new dimension of  humanity,  in which the
individual could live his dispersion in the community, finding a new body and a new self,
a new reason and a new I.17 In the same way, Peirce wrote that the individual man, “since
his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything
apart from his fellows, is only a negation.” If we negate man, we are leading towards
something different and must think totally anew: man can be thought of only as a shady
and passing figure of thought, destined to vanish.18 Thus, there are, as may be seen, some
good  reasons  to  interpret  the  meaning  of  the  community  in  Royce  (and  Peirce)  as
something  “super-human,”  in  a  Nietzschean  sense.  “The  concept  of  the  community
possesses – writes Royce (PC: 252, my emphasis) – a more than human significance.” It is
something definitely “super-personal” (PC: 83) and “possesses the virtue of a person of
higher level” (PC: 83). Something that guides towards a “larger self” (PC: 241).
22 What I am claiming is not that Royce actually took this direction, but that this could be a
fruitful way of interpreting his ideas.  Nonetheless,  although it  is absolutely true that
Nietzsche  looked at  the  mass  of  the  community  as  a  “herd,”  yet  we  can find  some
passages in his work (see for example Nietzsche 1909: § 132), in which he talks of the
“suppression of the individual” and of the formation of “large corporations and their
members,” as a typical property of our time. Likely, at that period, he was not sure of the
superiority of this process, but in a pseudo-aphorism of the Will to power, dated 1885, he
recalled that in archaic times the will aspired not to be a single person, but “to be like a
polis,” as happened in Greece, and that this was the honour and the virtue of the highest
men,  namely,  to  behave  all  together  as  a  single  organism,  as  a  corporate  entity.
Nowadays, writes Nietzsche, we still see traces of it in the esprit de corps, which is typical
of high rank officers, like in Prussia. We must strengthen, concludes the author, the will
to disappear as individual and eventually dive into a “great type” (Nietzsche 1925: § 783).
Hence there are some hints that Nietzsche too thought of a new idea of community as a
corporate body, a community that, of course, was neither the levelled and compassionate
Christian community, as was Royce’s,19 nor the sum of many discrete individuals. He was
probably thinking of a complex organism, as was the human body in the new version
given by biologists like Roux and Virchow, where unity simply means organization, “a
structure  of  power that  means  unity,  but  it’s  not  unity”  (Nietzsche 1925:  § 561).  The
hierarchical organization of many Machtquanta, a group of pares dominated by a leading
aristocracy,20 a Beloved Community, as Royce wrote, but made of aristoi, not of servants.
23 In both authors, though in different ways, there is no more distinction between individual
and  community:  every  individual  is  a  community  and  every  real  community  is  an
individual. This “collective Self” (Tauber 1994: 27) is a real Body: the body with “a great
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wisdom, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a flock and a shepherd,” which
Nietzsche refers to in the Zarathustra. We must then proceed “beyond man.”21
24 For Royce, man is a persona, but in the Latin sense: a mask of the community. But we could
say the same for Nietzsche, that writes in a fragment that man “acquires his qualities as
organ of the community,” and that his consciousness has evolved under the pressure of
the need of communications, through signs, showing to be nothing else than a sign effect
(Nietzsche 2001: § 354). For all three authors, then, the Ego is not a simple datum, but a
result of interpretation, an effect of public, meaningful constructions, and not at all its
source.22 Such is self-consciousness: a pure rebound, a consequence of our being-with-
others. Selfhood is a shady, wavering, complex, and not at all evident reality. Its tissues
are frayed, its nature vague, glassy as a sheet of water, internally divided and open. So,
again, where are its boundaries?
25 If man is a sign, it is not a mere finite entity, but, like any sign, it is an infinite and
unlimited reference, that unfolds through time and space, and that, like Peirce’s semiosis,
has no beginning and no end, that is not consistent per se,  that is “without walls,” as
Royce says (PC: 240):23 pure flux, or a crossing-place. “I am a sort of meeting place of
countless streams […] left to myself alone, I can never find out what my will is” (Royce
1908: 27-8). Like Walt Whitman, whom he quotes, Royce would have said: “I am large, I
contain multitudes.” These multitudes, contained in any I, this Many in which any One
unfolds,  is  something properly superhuman. “The Superhuman is in us” (Royce 1908:
378). It is not something to wait for in the future. But the Superman is the one who knows
how to  live  a  new corporeity,  that  great  living  body  that  Royce  identifies  with  the
Community.  “Behind your thoughts and feelings – recites Zarathustra in the passage
already quoted – there stands a mighty ruler, and unknown sage – whose name is Self. In
your body he dwells: he is your body.” The real Self is the Body, but the only and real
body is the Body of the Community, in Royce’s view. Royce permits us a vision of the
communitarian self as an incorporated and carnal reality, something more than a pure
and  evanescent  sign,  as  it  was  for  the  young  Peirce,24 and  something  more  than  a
Superman considered as a man that simply exalts the sphere of instincts, as sometimes
appears by a quick reading of Nietzsche.
26 As Nietzsche thought,  the Death of God (considered as the loss of any ancient value)
means the Death of Man, of a man considered as a simple and unitary organism, as the
sum of a body and a soul. I think that Royce and Peirce could have joined him in this
particular form of a-theism, in which the “Hope of a Great Community” (Royce) means
the Hope of a “Great Politics” (Nietzsche 2001: § 377) and, thus, of the “Great Health”
(Nietzsche 2001: § 38). In this peculiar sense, all three authors help us to start thinking of
a process of depersonification of humanity.
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NOTES
1. Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, with the introduction of John E. Smith and a revised
edition by F.  Oppenheim (Washington,  D.C.,  The Catholic  University  of  America Press,  2001).
From now on PC, followed by page number. The interest for Peirce by Royce lead him to rescue
Peirce manuscripts and work to bring them to Harvard after his death. “During the spring of
1915 it  was impossible to enter the study of Professor Royce in Emerson Hall,  without being
acutely couscous of the manuscripts of Charles Sanders Peirce which at that time filled every
available surface of table, chair and floor with their bulky, dusty and yet somehow intriguing
disorder”  (W. F. Kernan 1965: 3).  It  was  Victor  Lenzen to  run to  Arisbe,  Peirce’s  hideaway in
Pennsylvania,  to take care of  Peirce’s  papers,  and Morris Cohen, another of  the best Royce’s
students,  to  sponsor  some  years  later  the  Collected  Papers  edition  and  the  engagement  of
Hartshorne and Weiss in it.
2. C. S. Peirce (1868, in Peirce 1992: 26). From now on EP, followed by volume and page number.
3. These themes are approached in Fraser’s The Works of George Berkeley, a 1871 review, now in
(EP1: 83).
4. Cf. on this point De Tienne (2002: 30).
5. There is a similar phrase in a letter that E. C. Hegeler sent to Peirce. Cf. De Tienne (2002: 29).
Cf. on this themes also Colapietro 1989.
6. Leibniz (1898: § 67).
7. See on this point Tauber (1994: 27).
8. Cf. on these themes The Doctrine of Chances (EP1: 150).
9. The verses are from Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, 2.2.143-48.
10. I owe this quotation to André De Tienne’s writing quoted above. Peirce’s manuscript number
is R 403.
11. Briody (1969: 27) proposes to see as members of the triad the Interpreter, the Interpretant
and the Interpreted, and more specifically, the Beloved Community, the Individual and Christ.
12. On this point let me propose the following suggestion: could this vision of the We (or They) of
the Community be read as an authentic version of the Heideggerian Das Man?
13. In this writing Peirce makes reference to his 1868 paper and the theory of man-sign, but says
that  it  was  “too  nominalistic.”  This  new  version  of  the  theory,  without  any  doubt,  is  an
expression of  the realist  doctrine (in the medieval  sense)  that Peirce emphasized during the
second part of his life.
14. See  on  these  issues  Bell  (2005:  147).  Royce  proposes  a  “religious  reinterpretation  of  the
doctrine of the ‘superman’,” concludes Bell. Frank Oppenheim (1993: 189) writes that Nietzsche’s
conception  of  developmental  individuality  exercised  a  notable  influence  on  Royce’s  mature
thought.
15. Cf. on this issue Bell (2005: 130). Yet, I would be oriented, as I will write, to reconsider the
Nietzschean view of the “community.” Cf. on these issues again Tauber (1994: 30) and Fabbrichesi
(2010: 20-2).
16. I could look up at an Italian translation of the essay in Nietzsche e l’America, Pisa, ETS, 2005,
255-75.
17. Cf. F. Nietzsche (1995: § 4): “‘I’, you say, and are proud of that word. But the greater thing – in
which you are unwilling to believe is your body with its great wisdom; that does not say ‘I’, but
does ‘I’ […] The body is a great wisdom, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a flock and
a shepherd.” And remember that the despisers of the body “are no bridges to the Superman.”
18. For a similar view, cf. M. Foucault 1966.
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19. “This new being is a corporate entity,  the body of Christ,  or the body of which the now
divinely exalted Christ is the head. Of this body the exalted Christ is also, for Paul, the spirit, and
also, in some new sense, the lover. This corporate entity is the Christian community itself” (PC:
93).
20. Cf. on these themes Fabbrichesi (2010: 12-3), and Tauber (1994: 27).
21. Royce  (1917:  126)  quotes  here  Zarahustra,  using a  translation of  the  word “ubermensch”
slightly different from the usual “superman” or “overman.” That is significant, in my opinion.
22. Cf De Tienne (2002, 2009), e PC (X.2). On this theme we could trace a fruitful link not only to
Nietzsche’s, but to Foucault’s perspective, too, I think. The Self – as Colapietro underlines (1989:
43) – “is both a result and a transformer of the practice of signs.”
23. See on this point Corrington 1983.
24. In some personal exchanges A. de Tienne convinced me that Peirce, from Man’s Glassy Essence
on,  was  interested  in  clearing  a  theory  of  protoplasm  –  this  latter  understood  as  a  glassy
substance that could behave both like a solid and like a liquid – in order to substantiate in a more
physical and biological way the idea of the “glassy” essence of the man-sign. In fact, his idea of
“corporate personalities” can be seen as a reinforcement of that perspective: “Consciousness is a
sort of public spirit among the nerve-cells,” he wrote, and “man is a community of cells” (CP
1.672). Notwithstanding this biological implications, so close to Nietzsche’s interests, the idea of
the man-sign as an incorporeal reality coincides with the stoic semiotic tradition, according to
which meaning is one of the “incorporeal” realities.
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